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Abstract
The United States Air Force (USAF) is currently facing a 2,400-pilot shortage in
an increasingly constrained budgetary environment. Without pilots to engage the enemy,
deliver weapons, and provide logistics support for operations, the USAF could lose the
ability to fly, fight, and win global engagements and defend the homeland. This study
focused on Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) as a means of producing the USAF’s
pilots to offset the current shortage. Specifically, this study compared UPT to the recently
initiated Pilot Training-Next (PTN) program through a cost-benefit analysis. Like any
new technology integration, PTN’s virtual reality training will require further study for
proofing and justification prior to full-scale implementation and further utilization of
constrained USAF resources. This study’s use of extant financial and historical
production data, coupled with interviews with PTN instructors, highlights the potential of
PTN. Ultimately, this study’s cost-benefit analysis uniquely contributes to the growing
body of virtual reality training research through a Formula for Change theoretical lens,
while simultaneously providing USAF decision makers a comparison of program costs,
projected production capacity, and quality of training.
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A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF PILOT TRAINING NEXT

I.

Introduction

Motivation & Background
The United States Air Force (USAF) is currently facing a 2,400-pilot shortage [1]
in an increasingly constrained budgetary environment [2], [3]. Without pilots to engage
the enemy, deliver weapons, and provide logistics support for operations, the USAF
could lose the ability to fly, fight, and win global engagements and defend our homeland
[4], [5].
The USAF is no stranger to pilot shortages [6] and the current shortage is no less
dire than its predecessors. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO),
the current shortage affects many pilot communities (e.g., fighter, bomber, and special
operations pilots) and extends to other Department of Defense (DoD) agencies [5]. As
the pilot community with the worst shortage, each USAF fighter pilot represents a
substantial investment to the USAF with a cost-to-train between $3 and $11 million over
five years [5]. Staffing and personnel moves are handled within each career field, but not
having enough personnel to call upon severely limits flexibility in assigning the best
qualified candidate to each authorization [7]. Since 2012, the number of fully trained,
mission-ready fighter pilots filling critical positions (staffing levels) has dropped
precipitously below the total available positions (authorizations) as shown by Figure 1.
For example, in 2017, less than 3,000 fighter pilots filled congressionally-allocated
positions (including staff, training, and flying positions), representing a 27% gap between
authorized and staffed positions; this trend is expected to continue past the year 2030 [5].
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Source: GAO-18-113 [5]

Figure 1: Current Fighter Pilot Shortage, Authorizations vs Staffing Levels [5]
According to Lt. Gen. Gina Grosso, the Air Force Manpower, Personnel and
Services Deputy Chief of Staff, the USAF’s plan to fix the current pilot shortage
concentrates on evaluating three paths: reducing demand for pilots in non-flying
positions, increasing retention of current pilots and increasing the number of new pilots
produced through training [8]. To date, the USAF has explored the following methods to
fix the shortage:
1) pilot retention bonuses [9], [10],
2) voluntary return to active duty from retirement [8], [11], [12],
3) pilot life-improvement programs [12], [13],
4) personality testing as a prognosticator for airmanship skills [14], [15],
5) the feasibility of fly-only pilot tracks [16],
6) a warrant officer track [17], [18] and
7) the inclusion of enlisted aviators [19], [20].
Many of the explored methods have skewed heavily toward retention or getting
existing pilots back to flying, leaving increased training production relatively unexplored.
This is likely due to increased pilot production’s unique challenges including the
increased number of required aircraft, amplified instructor availability constraints, and
2

support functions and resource limitations (e.g. maintenance, facilities, infrastructure, and
auxiliary services) [21]–[23]. If the current aircraft inventory cannot cope with the
increased demand, the USAF would also need to overcome the rising cost and complexity
associated with procuring additional aircraft [24], [25]. Assuming more aircraft could be
acquired, the USAF still requires qualified training instructors sourced from already
strained staff and flying positions [8]. These potential instructors must continually be
won over from the enticing offers to fly with commercial airlines [26], [27].
Consequently, two key questions emerge: 1) Is there a way to train more pilots without
obtaining additional aircraft and support equipment? 2) Is there a way to train more
pilots without increasing the strain caused by drawing instructors from critical positions?
Fortunately, the USAF has already discovered the principal components of a
solution. This solution comes in the form of emerging technologies that improve existing
simulation capabilities. Historically, the USAF’s technology adoption was constrained
by expensive initial and recurring sustainment costs that ultimately limited total
availability [28]. Despite these constraints, the USAF has depended upon simulators for
decades “to reduce costs, extend aircraft life, maintain flying proficiency, and provide
more effective training, especially in areas difficult to train in operational aircraft [29:ii].”
However, with the expansion of virtual reality for educational purposes [30]–[32] and
recent surges in hardware and software proliferation, costs for virtual reality training have
fallen dramatically as the technology becomes more mainstream [33], [34]. This means
virtual reality now presents an excellent alternative to traditional USAF simulators by
providing a realistic training experience at a lower cost [35].
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Research Gap
Perhaps fortuitously, the current USAF pilot shortage arose concurrently with the
rapid expansion of virtual reality training capabilities. Unfortunately, despite support for
virtual reality training’s growing utility at a reduced cost, this change in thinking also
exposes a dearth of extant research specifically related to USAF pilot training. To be
effective, virtual reality pilot training must simulate the real world as accurately as
possible to ensure the highest transfer of training and pilot safety [36]. This is necessary
because a USAF pilot’s job is dynamic and involves coordination and cooperation
between multiple individuals to achieve a successful sortie [37]. Previous studies have
employed innovative equipment and extolled virtual reality’s immersive environment for
training, yet no study has examined a virtual reality training environment sufficiently
complex enough to replace portions of USAF pilot training (e.g., the ability to replicate
realistic data-intensive task management and situational awareness scenarios while
monitoring multiple pilots’ complex cognitive loads [38]–[40]). Furthermore, no studies
have addressed the costs and benefits of virtual reality training as a means of overcoming
organizational resistance to adopting the technology.
Research Purpose
This study focuses on Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) administered by the
USAF’s Air Education and Training Command (AETC) and compares UPT’s cost,
production, and quality to the recently initiated Pilot Training-Next (PTN) program
through a cost-benefit analysis. A cost-benefit analysis was chosen because it compares
current and new approaches by offering “a unique opportunity to transform legacy
defense forces into efficient, effective, and accountable 21st-century organizations [2:1].”
4

The initial budget and format of PTN suggest that this new approach could
represent a cheaper, faster and more flexible way to increase the number of trained USAF
pilots to offset the current shortage [41]. While PTN explores many areas of pilot
training innovation, this study focused specifically on PTN’s utilization of virtual reality
training. The first iteration of PTN employed virtual reality training in place of some
training flights, thus reducing the number of required flights in actual training aircraft.
Additionally, with the increased modularity and portability of the PTN setup, each
instructor retained greater ability to train more than one student at a time, directly
improving those students’ flying skills. Like any new technology integration, PTN’s
virtual reality training will require further study for proofing and justification prior to
full-scale implementation and additional utilization of constrained USAF resources [42],
[43].
This study’s cost-benefit analysis will uniquely contribute to the growing body of
virtual reality training research through a Formula for Change theoretical lens, while
simultaneously providing USAF decision makers a comparison of program costs,
projected production capacity, and quality of training. To achieve this, the cost
investigation centers on assessing and comparing PTN’s initial, fixed, and variable costs
to UPT’s respective costs. Next, PTN’s impact to USAF mission-ready pilot availability,
via optimized aircraft and instructor utilization, illustrates how quickly full
implementation of PTN—provided current support levels—could heal the current pilot
shortage. Finally, this study’s quality investigation establishes context and comparison of
quality between PTN and UPT pilots.

5

II.

Literature Review

This literature review contains five main sections. The first section begins with
some formative military and civilian virtual reality training research to reinforce the
scope and significance of this study. In the next section, the Formula for Change, as a
theoretical framework, restructures the complex nature and outcomes of pilot training via
meaningful ‘lenses’ for analysis [44], [45]. After theory, the last three sections discuss
the components of the cost-benefit analysis. This study compares the cost, production
capacity, and quality of pilots, through the Formula for Change lens to provide the
appropriate background for the reader to understand the literature in this domain of
research.
Virtual Reality Training
Virtual reality’s flexibility, low cost, and popularity have not escaped the
attention of the USAF and the military industrial complex, especially for realizing virtual
reality’s potential for training. As far back as 1991, the USAF Human Resources
Directorate’s Intelligent Training Branch began studying the utility and preliminary
applications of virtual reality training for relatively simple spatial, navigational, and
sequential tasks. Despite using rudimentary virtual reality technology, the study found
that students who trained with virtual reality showed increased knowledge retention,
faster acclimation over multiple training iterations, and superior task performance when
compared to a statistically-generated random benchmark [46]. Following that study, the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held a conference focused on applying
virtual reality training to more complex tasks including “systems for dismounted
combatants, mission rehearsal for special operations, training ship handling skills, tele6

robotics, and practicing military medical procedures [36:iii].” Ultimately, these subject
matter experts recommended focusing on military-specific virtual reality training to
overcome human factors obstacles (e.g., haptics, user interfaces, stimulation methods)
while increasing user response accuracy and decreasing cyber sickness [47].
Military research is not the only source of studies aimed at validating virtual
reality training as a means of improving student task proficiency and refining system
scalability from a managerial standpoint [48]. In 2002, a randomized, double-blinded
specialized medical study found virtual reality-trained students performed their tasks 29%
faster than non-virtual reality-trained students [49]. Additionally, these students made six
times fewer errors and nine times fewer failure-to-progress indications [49]. The same
study identified a need for greater focus on increased transfer-of-training from virtual
success to operational success to enable a pathway to more sophisticated uses of virtual
reality (e.g., assessments, training, error reduction, and certifications) [49]. Similarly, a
successful 2016 virtual reality-based training study created for non-military drone pilots
highlighted the difficulty of modeling non-linear, three-dimensional problem-solving
environments, the need for improvement in physics models for realism, and additional
external validation [50].
Theory
The original Formula for Change was attributed to David Gleicher who created
the formula as a framework for solving complex organizational problems [51], [52]. The
formula was reframed by Kathleen Dannemiller who sought to integrate organizational
buy-in with technological innovation to connect organizations to their desired outcomes
in a simple, understandable format [52], [53].
7

Taking Gleicher’s utilitarian problem-solving tool and applying Dannemiller’s
mnemonic style, this study developed the model shown in Figure 2. This figure
demonstrates the relationship and implications of the following components as they relate
to this study: virtual reality pilot training represents a possible end-state or change;
USAF guidance and community buy-in for that change represent the shared vision; PTN
represents an innovative first step toward the change; motivation captures the
dissatisfaction with the status quo and desire to achieve the change; resistance captures
any residual hindrance to attaining the change.

Figure 2: Modified Formula for Change Component Breakout
Stepping through each of the components, the modified Formula for Change
model assumes change begins with shared vision. Shared vision encapsulates the
concepts of leadership and member awareness of an issue, a clearly defined end-state,
and a path toward that desired end-state [45], [54]. In this case, the USAF’s shared
vision requires cost effective spending and rapid acquisition of innovation [4], [55] to
overcome the current pilot shortage. This vision provides guidance for execution of
innovation and the application of motivation to collectively overcome resistance.
Innovation consists of the first actions necessary to get to the desired end-state
(e.g., leveraging technology, adopting best practices, and restructuring the organization).
For technology to constitute innovation in this model, the technology must be real and
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applicable to the end-state. If the technology is only theoretical or lacks utility to reach
the end-state, increased motivation may be required to improve and apply the innovation
to overcome resistance. Initially, innovation is binary for this model, the focus is
determining whether action occurs or not, instead of identifying the effectiveness of that
innovation. Yet, the long-term effectiveness is still important, especially when
considering validation is necessary to sustain motivation. Often innovation comes at a
high initial cost, with quantifiable benefits realized many years later; this is where a costbenefit analysis provides context and quantifiably demonstrates strengths and weaknesses
of the innovation compared to the status quo [2].
Motivation includes both dissatisfaction with the status quo and proximity to the
change compared to the costs of getting to that desired end-state [56]. Proximity
represents the gap between the issue and the end-state. If that gap is too large, motivation
can decline if not countered by a high dissatisfaction with the status quo [45]. For this
scenario, the benefits of attaining and sustaining virtual reality training are just beginning
to surface, however for PTN to succeed, these benefits must positively outweigh the costs
(e.g., capital, time, risk) to perpetuate motivation.
The previous components must be present, in sufficient quantity, and function
collaboratively to overcome resistance. An important intuition of the modified Formula
for Change model comes from this compound structure that indicates that if any of the
change components (left-side, green arrows) are missing or zero, resistance (right-side,
red arrow) could prevent the change. This is because resistance to change is rarely, if
ever, zero [52]. Assuming the reduction of resistance to the change cannot occur by
force, and neither the dissatisfaction with the current pilot shortage nor USAF’s vision
and resolve to fix it are likely to diminish, PTN’s success remains the only component
9

open for modulation and assessment. To measure and validate this success, this research
focused on three areas: cost, production, and quality to substantiate a cost-benefit
analysis.
Cost
Cost estimation and forecasting research is as diverse and varied as the many
projects and applications that depend on such calculations [2], [57]. Regardless of any
assumptions made to develop a cost comparison, all calculations must adhere to generally
accepted principals of accounting for validity [58], and be grounded in units that make
sense to data consumers—in this case, USAF decision makers [59]. Historically, the
USAF has overcome resistance to adoption of increasing fidelity training devices by
demonstrating that flight simulators cost less than real aircraft--both in training time
savings and when acquisition cost-per-unit are amortized over the life of the system [28].
Contemporary research also supports lowering total cost-per-pilot by capitalizing on
virtual reality with the added benefit of improving the realism, scalability and flexibility
of military training [38], [47], [60]. Unfortunately, virtual reality training has not yet
reached a steady state, a condition that severely limits the accuracy and utility of lifecycle cost projections [61], [62]. To counter this predicament, previous research has
focused on a variable cost-per-pilot as a metric for comparing simulator-based training to
aircraft-only methods [63].
Production
Another form of organizational resistance stems from comfort with the current
process and fear of the unknown when making significant changes [45]. Currently, the
USAF trains pilots on a rigid timeline wherein student pilots are introduced to flight
10

concepts and then tested via evaluation flights, steadily increasing pilot proficiency and
complexity [23]. To standardize flying proficiency the USAF begins formal flight
training with UPT. This training includes ground school for basic airmanship, simulation
training, and actual flights in real aircraft. UPT uses the T-6 Texan II for the first phase
of training, then separates students into more specialized tracks. These training tracks
utilize more complex training aircraft including the T-1 Jayhawk for mobility pilots and
the T-38 Talon for fighter pilots. Pilots then attend dedicated aircraft training at a Formal
Training Unit (FTU). This training, coupled with additional time at their operational base
allows for certification as mission-ready pilots in their respective Mission Design Series
(MDS), otherwise known as their primary aircraft. Each phase of this training pipeline
requires time, aircraft, instructors, and supporting resources. Therefore, any change to
this production process has long-reaching implications and contributes to organizational
resistance to changing the current process [23].
A way to overcome this resistance to organizational change is to get leadership
and member buy-in [45]. The USAF leadership recently implored Airmen to solve
complex issues (like the pilot shortage) by leveraging the best of technology and industry
innovation [4], [55]. Simulator training is an example of this civilian innovation, and is
now accepted as an integral part of the processes of civilian pilot training [64]. Even the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)—the regulatory oversight for many of the
USAF’s main competitors for retaining highly-skilled pilots [10]—now permits up to
100% replacement of initial and recurring training and evaluations on simulators instead
of aircraft, assuming minimum simulator capabilities and functionality [65].
Additional USAF member buy-in can be generated by allowing members to feel
empowered by innovation and proximity to the success of the initial PTN pilots [45].
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Opportunity to be part of the change could come through implementing and absorbing the
continuing advances in computer hardware, software and peripheral devices that enable
virtual reality’s leverage as a training device to engage human senses to a greater degree
than legacy simulators at a lower cost [60]. Perhaps some members, especially
instructors seeking a reason to stay in the USAF, would find empowerment via virtual
training’s capacity for greater instructor engagement that, in turn, leads to better transfer
of training and, potentially, better pilots [66], [67]. Others may find motivation in virtual
reality training’s reduced instructor workload, and the subsequent decreased wear on
training airframes [23]. Finally, virtual reality training’s reduced implementation
timeframe and technology refreshment cycles, following Moore’s Law, combine to allow
for more rapid change and upgrade cycles compared to previous technology [68]. This
enables untold flexibility and adaptability as a skills-teaching tool [60] that correlates to
higher job satisfaction for instructor pilots.
The implementation of PTN is the USAF’s innovative first step to reducing the
pilot shortage. PTN incorporates virtual reality headsets and high-fidelity physical
training equipment with tactile, audio, and haptic feedback. These features, accentuated
by instructors and artificial intelligence, provide training scenarios as close to realistic
flight as possible. Students engage this training unbound by UPT’s lockstep pass-or-fail
timeline. Instead PTN encourages exploration at each individual’s learning level, both
during on-duty and off-duty hours. Available aircraft or simulator support limitations no
longer constrain training. Instead, student pilots have more opportunities to train:
virtually in their dorms, cooperatively with peers, and with instructors in realistic
scenarios to further hone their skills.
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Quality
Possessing initial levels of vision, innovation, and motivation may not be enough
to overcome resistance to change [45]. To overcome resistance and sustain the change,
each of these components must actively support and reinforce the others. Stated another
way: to ensure maximum motivation, vision must drive the innovation. Innovation then
must prove at least partially successful to maintain momentum and the enthusiasm that
transforms the innovation into the new status quo, the desired end-state [45].
For PTN’s innovation to become accepted as the new status quo for pilot training
throughout the USAF pilot community, PTN graduates must be the same or better quality
when compared to their peers [69]. All the cost savings, production optimization, and
increased realistic virtual experience would be meaningless if the PTN pilots do not
perform at an equitable level as their UPT peers. If unchecked, this condition opens PTN
to reduced acceptance and motivation, and greater negativity toward the change. This
would further fuel organizational resistance and potentially prevent the USAF’s change
from UPT to PTN.
This is not the first study to assess the quality of pilot training across competing
programs. Previous USAF simulator upgrades have demonstrated that improved flight
training devices positively correlated to a greater transfer of training and increased
student pilot skill retention when compared to legacy training [70]. More recently, a
comprehensive 2003 study found that virtual reality training improved productivity and
flight experience especially in areas of critical factor recognition, decision-making skills,
situational awareness, and crew coordination [71]. These findings were reinforced by
studies that concluded that the retention of skills taught in a virtual reality environment
were based primarily on equipment fidelity, realism, and integration of available
13

technology [72], [73]. A corollary study found little to no difference between the fidelity
of simulators used for training--beyond a defined minimum requirement--when
measuring the quality of training via regression [74]. However, that same study indicated
a marked improvement in flying task performance by simulation-trained pilots versus a
control group who received no simulator training.
As an important caveat for quality measurement, one study found a positive
correlation between a student’s interest in a specific technology with their ultimate
retention of skills taught using that technology [75]. Another study conducted between
online and in-residence (non-pilot) students concluded that overall performance,
quantified by grades, was chiefly dependent upon each student’s motivation and ability to
self-regulate learning [76]. Together, these studies indicate that each student’s receptivity
to the training method and individual motivation likely bears consequence upon overall
performance and corresponding scores.
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III.

Methodology

This study employed multiple data collection methods including qualitative telecommunication and in-person interviews with subject matter and data experts. A site
visit focused on collecting production and financial information in addition to
interviewing PTN leadership to gain content for the qualitative analysis. The following
sections detail the information sources, assumptions, limitations, and approaches used to
establish this study’s cost, production, and quality analysis.
Cost
Cost estimation and analysis require standardized data collection to substantiate
cost-effectiveness between alternative flight training programs [28]. For consistency, this
research’s cost data was derived from AFI 65-503 (Tables A34-1, A34-2 and A4-1) [77],
AETC’s Financial Management official records (derived from Air Force Total Ownership
Cost (AFTOC) data), and UPT historical production data provided by the Air Force
Personnel Center Headquarters Strategic Research and Assessments Branch. This
research utilized the following syllabi as they represent the highest total USAF capital
and personnel investment: Sheppard Air Force Base’s USAF Euro-NATO Jet Pilot
Training syllabi for T-6 and T-38 (P-V4A-N and P-V4A-N[T-38C], respectively) and
Laughlin Air Force Base’s T-1 syllabus (P-V4A-G). Additionally, as PTN is under
development, it lacks robust historical financial programing comparable to UPT;
therefore, fiscal year 2018 budget allocations and student grade sheets from the first
iteration comprise this research’s PTN financial underpinnings.
Following accepted methods for conducting a cost-benefit analysis [2], [59] and
in adherence to AFI 65-503 costing and government accepted accounting practices [57]
15

the total cost-per-pilot for each program was chosen as the key comparison metric. This
research utilized flying and logistics costs broken out per hour, per airframe. Those
costs, multiplied against each representative syllabus’ hourly requirements, provide
UPT’s total and variable cost as a benchmark to compare against PTN’s initial, fixed, and
variable cost. Additionally, Moore’s Law was integral to this study’s cost assumptions
for technological development timing, and provided the two-year aviation-based system
replacement cycle necessary for forecasting programmatic costs [68].
Production
When performing production forecasting as part of a cost-benefit analysis,
research must focus on comparable attributes of both programs and to highlight the
limiting factors for each [2], [57]. This research calculated production capabilities for
both UPT and PTN using the previously described documentation and focused on
production of Combat Air Force (CAF) and Mobility Air Force (MAF) pilots as both
UPT and PTN produce these pilot-tracks. This research discovered the production
limiting factors via interviews with subject matter experts.
After establishing the context of production restrictions, research moved to
comparative projections of total pilot output through iterative optimization. This
analysis, predicated on Little’s Law, considered the change in arrival of inventory
(student pilots through each phase of training) and reduction of delays to determine
overall output to return a metric encompassing the USAF’s total usable time of fullytrained, mission-ready pilots. Additionally, Little’s Law grounded student pilot inventory
and delay-induced bottleneck calculations [62] that were then used to compare this
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study’s iterative improvements over a ten-year notional period. The ten-year period helps
illustrate each optimization’s efficacy against the pilot shortage.
Quality
As is often the case with cost-benefit analysis, a nascent system like PTN may not
have sufficient data for fruitful comparison [2] especially in the first iteration. This study
proved no exception. Great effort went into collecting data to compare the PTN students’
grades to a normalized evaluation score baseline—derived from G-TIMS, a database that
tracks a multitude of pilot training metrics, including evaluation scores—however that
data proved to be unattainable in the timeframe allotted for this research. Additionally,
given the time between PTN completion and the wait time to enter FTU, a follow-up
comparison with the PTN students to their FTU peers proved difficult as only a few PTN
graduates had entered FTU courses. During this study, no PTN graduates had completed
their full training profile to produce comparable scores. Understandably, agents
responsible for those courses could not release information until graduation without
unduly influencing the outcome or otherwise skewing the results [80].
However, the majority of this research’s usable pilot quality comparison stemmed
from the data gathering research trip and interviews with instructor pilots involved in
PTN. Individual and group interviews were conducted to gather information on
perceived attributes considered critical to performance. The term ‘attribute’ refers to the
inherent cognitive aptitudes and personality traits that must be present to acquire the level
of knowledge and skills needed to successfully operate as, and adapt to, the unique
demands of a USAF pilot. The interviews included a review of PTN’s unique operations,
the stressors and job requirements associated with pilot duties, and how students compare
17

to former UPT students. Discussion also entailed a review of cognitive aptitude and
personality traits perceived as critical to adapting and thriving during PTN.
In addition to providing context and a better understanding of PTN, the instructor
pilots provided credible observations of the PTN students’ performance and a comparison
to their previous (legacy UPT and FTU) students. It is important to note that the PTN
program recruited experienced instructor pilots from various legacy training platforms.
These include T-6 and T-38 instructor pilots and combat-proven mission ready pilots
from other primary weapons systems. Collectively, the instructor pilots provide PTN
students a comprehensive breadth of USAF aviation expertise that adds realism and
accuracy to the training experience.
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IV.

Analysis

This analysis section details the cost, production, and quality components of this
study’s cost-benefit analysis. The cost analysis utilizes graduate track ratios and
published financial information to compare PTN to UPT based on initial, fixed, and
variable costs. For production, historical UPT annual averages and aircraft utilization
ratios fortify each iterative increase in the USAF’s available pilots, based on incremental
optimization of wait-time reduction and application of PTN innovation across the pilot
training process. To add context, these optimizations—mapped over a notional ten-year
period—further delineate their respective impact to the current pilot shortage. Finally,
insight gleaned from PTN grade sheets and interviews with instructors comprises this
study’s quality analysis.
Cost
Utilizing historical UPT production data and PTN grade sheets, each program’s
graduates, sorted by track, provided working ratios necessary to determine costs per
graduate comparison, as seen in Table 1. As of this study, PTN only produced MAF and
CAF tracks, whereas UPT has historically produced additional tracks (e.g., helicopter,
remotely piloted aircraft). Since PTN has no comparable tracks to those additional UPT
tracks, only UPT’s values appear in the ‘Other’ column. Instead, since all PTN students
share a common course length, this study focused on the ratio of graduates for cost
development. This comparison helped frame PTN’s single iteration against UPT’s
historical production, and provides track ratios—specifically the MAF to CAF ratio—for
each training approach. For example, at 7% attrition the first iteration of PTN produced
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thirteen graduates, seven MAF and six CAF for a ratio of 1.2 to 1 as compared to UPT’s
historical 2.4 to 1 ratio.
Table 1: Track Production Details by Training Approach

Next the track ratios for UPT and PTN factored into each program’s cost-pergraduate per year. This cost comparison included academic, both virtual and non-virtual
reality simulators, flying and support costs for both training approaches. Using this
approach helped avoid the disparity between budget-induced changes in logistics costs
year-to-year and the variance of annual pilot production. Specific comparison costs are
detailed in the Appendix.
The distinction between fixed and variable cost is important for this comparison
as some costs are inherently incurred to run each program (fixed), while other costs
change with variations in total student pilots (variable). For example, a program needs
established base support and an operable airfield regardless of the number of pilots.
These are considered fixed costs. Conversely, the number of simulators in each program
is dependent on the total number of students in the program; additional students require
increased hardware, driving the variable cost per student up.
For this study’s comparison, shown in Table 2, a summation of academic,
simulator, flying, and support costs for the T-6 and—for UPT only—the secondary
training platform (CAF: T-38 or MAF: T-1) comprised both UPT and PTN’s fixed cost
per graduate. The variable track costs (sans support cost) incorporated a summation of
each programs’ academics, simulator, and flying costs. Ultimately, PTN’s fixed costs
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represent a fraction, 45% MAF and 28% CAF, of those for UPT. Following that trend,
PTN’s variable costs are only 32%, MAF, and 13%, CAF, of those incurred by UPT. As
an accounting validity check, this study’s CAF figures are 9% under, and MAF
calculations are within 1% of AFI-65-503’s published figures.
Table 2: Cost Comparison Between UPT and PTN by Cost Type

Production Analysis
The current UPT approach utilizes approximately 117 flight-hours in the T-6
training aircraft per graduate. After UPT, an additional 86 flight-hours for the T-38 CAF
track or 78 flight-hours for the T-1 MAF track are required, depending on the pilot’s
specialization. As noted previously, the largest benefit of PTN is the reduced number of
aircraft and instructors required to train pilots. PTN’s innovative virtual reality training
fulfills most of each pilot’s instruction and practice, requiring only 65 hours in the T-6 for
training and real-world evaluation, regardless of track. For context, this means PTN
effectively eliminates the need for UPT’s T-38 and T-1 flight-hours. Comparison of
requirements between programs yields a ratio of flight hours (UPT T-6 to PTN T-6) equal
to 117:65 or 9 to 5. This implies that if instructors and other support functions are
available, PTN could increase pilot production by an additional 44.44% to match the
current UPT T-6 utilization rate and flying hour program projections. Given the current
1,000 pilots produced per year, PTN production could increase to 1,444 pilots per year
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with no additional operational costs (e.g. aircraft, fuel, maintenance) than currently
allocated to UPT.
This analysis utilizes a concept coined ‘Pilot Ready Years’ as a unit of measure
representing the aggregate time-service commitment produced annually for the Air Force.
For example, the current UPT production is 1,000 pilots per year, each of whom incur a
ten-year time service commitment upon completion of UPT. Each pilot may spend up to
two of those time service commitment years waiting for an open FTU slot and then
completing training. The USAF loses those Pilot Ready Years. Since the current annual
production of 1,000 UPT graduates wait one year, on average, for FTU and require one
year to complete FTU, then each graduate retains 8 years of commitment or 8,000 Pilot
Ready Years (8×1,000) for the group, each year. This appears in Figure 3 as “Current
Training.”
The next row, “Current PTN,” indicates the PTN approach with no other change
in the production of pilots from before. While the timeline changes, the production and
Pilot Ready Years remain the same. This means the same total number of pilots
graduate, but the PTN graduates are mission-ready six months earlier compared to their
UPT peers with no increase in total Pilot Ready Years.
The “Excess Capacity” row shows PTN replacing UPT and production raised to
max capacity of 1,444 pilots per year, as discussed above. This condition still does not
increase total Pilot Ready Years, and, more importantly, illustrates the problem of partial
PTN implementation. Following Little’s Law, higher PTN production alone leads to a
higher inter-arrival rate into the wait buffer between training, effectively increasing the
queue length and total system wait time. This is due to the FTU’s inability to accept the
excess capacity of new pilots given available aircraft, support personnel and
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infrastructure constraints. In short, this becomes a pilot training bottleneck, contributing
to delays in pilot production. If allowed to manifest, this could create a worse backlog,
lower motivation, and increase organizational resistance to PTN’s innovation.
To ease the bottleneck, it seems intuitive to simply replace UPT with PTN,
synchronize training slots, and eliminate all wait-time. However, doing so has potentially
negative consequences if not addressed carefully. Since PTN takes only six months, two
courses fill the same timeframe as each year-long UPT course. If each PTN course tried
to produce 1000 pilots every six months this would incur twice the utilization on training
airframes and complicate scheduling. Additionally, this higher utilization rate on the T-6
could potentially drive time-intensive flying hour program and sustainment
recalculations, and increasing resistance to PTN.
To circumvent this condition, the row labeled “Sub-Optimal,” consists of
adopting the PTN model for the entire pilot production process (UPT and FTU) to
remove the bottleneck. This approach assumes production remains at 1,000 pilots per
year (500 every six months) and elimination of all wait-time between training courses.
The total training time reduces to 1 year versus 2.5 or 3 years, allowing for a 19%
increase in total Pilot Ready Years, up to 9,500 per group.
This option sounds achievable, yet the USAF can do even better by setting annual
production equal to the current annual T-6 flying hour allocation, as shown by the
“Optimal” row. To ensure this change does not put T-6 utilization over allocation, total
annual flying hours are divided between two six-month long PTN courses per year. This
increases annual production capability from 1,000 pilots to 1,444 pilots per year (722
every six months). Now utilizing the PTN model for full pilot production (UPT and
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FTU) and increasing pilot production consistent with the current flying-hour program
yields 13,718 Pilot Ready Years (1,444 × 9.5 = 13,718).

Figure 3: Pilot Production with Incremental Adoption of the PTN Approach
Applying the previous optimizations over a longer timeframe allows for a better
understanding of consequence measured by the speed the USAF could theoretically
recover from the current pilot shortage. Figure 4 results from using a ten-year timeframe
broken up into 12-month segments for a comparison of cumulative pilot production
values after implementing iterative improvements.
Stepping through the figure, the lowest output represents the current pilot training
production: 1000 graduates per year progress through 12 months each of UPT, FTU, and
the wait between UPT and FTU, yielding 8,000 pilots after 10 years. The next higher
production represents PTN replacing UPT, with no change to the 12-month wait and 12month FTU, yielding the same 8,000 graduates after 10 years. The difference between
these two approaches is that the pilots will be ready six months sooner with the PTN
implementation. If the wait-time is removed between UPT and FTU in the current pilot
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production, this would yield the same 8,000 pilots one year sooner than the current
approach, with a total production of 9,000 pilots after 10 years. Replacing only UPT with
PTN and removing the 12-month wait prior to current 12-month FTU training also yields
9,000 pilots after 10 years. However, if the PTN approach replaces both UPT and FTU
with all wait-time removed, total production reaches 9,500 pilots at 10 years, a 19%
increase over current production. Finally, if PTN throughput is held at the current
planned and budgeted allocation for the T-6 (1,444 pilots per year) to avoid sustainment
consequences, total production yields 13,718 pilots after 10 years, representing a 71%
improvement over current production.

Figure 4: Comparison of Pilot Production Optimizations
Quality
The quality portion of this cost-benefit analysis began with the understanding that
quality could be compared by establishing quantitative metrics that were both accurate
and useful [81]. Initially, this study sought the following metrics as acceptable measures
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of quality comparison between UPT and PTN: track selection criteria and the average
speed of pilots through each phase of training. These metrics should have added context
and bolstered a comparison of evaluation flight scores. However, in developing these
metrics, complications forced a shift in focus to the empirical evidence from instructor
interviews as a more qualitative measure [82] for comparing UPT and PTN pilots.
One potential quality issue concerned class stratification. Competition and
stratification are time-honored components of USAF training, and pilot training is no
exception [83]. Both UPT and PTN train to minimum flying competencies, albeit
through different scheduling timeframes because of aircraft and instructor availability and
student progression. Additionally, each student’s progression through the training phases
directly feeds into a stratification that determines which track each student earns, and
ultimately what aircraft they fly after graduation. With the increased utilization of virtual
reality training, PTN’s overall course length was significantly shorter when compared to
UPT. This may have impacted instructors’ ability to stratify students who were
competing for specific tracks.
Looking closer at PTN student grades, it appeared PTN CAF graduates finished
the first phase of training faster (69.17 ± 6.68 days) than PTN MAF graduates (87.86 ±
10.76 days). Due to course length restrictions this gave CAF graduates more time in the
specialized training phase (47 ± 5.37 days) compared to their MAF counterparts (26.71 ±
11.06 days). This result implies that more highly motivated students may have more time
in specialized training, thus gaining greater proficiency prior to graduation; this parallels
the track differentiation and stratification methods of UPT.
With track selection synchronized, the next planned step for comparing PTN to
UPT involves determining standardized evaluation flight scores for each phase of UPT to
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benchmark against PTN evaluation flight scores. This comparison should employ a
simplified non-parametric statistical comparison such as a Student’s T-Test, given the
small PTN sample size. This information tells decision makers whether PTN scores fell
within the historical average for UPT and shows how PTN graduates compared to their
UPT contemporaries.
Unfortunately, supporting data for this portion of the cost-benefit analysis did not
come to fruition. One reason for this appears in Figure 5. This thirty-month snapshot
shows the grade variability of only one of four evaluation flights across three UPT bases.
According to G-TIMS analysts, this grade variability is attributed to such disparate
factors as each base’s different training syllabus, rotating instructor cadre, seasonal
weather, and base-specific support limitations. Despite this information, this study is
unable to tell which of those factors played a statistically significant role in that data
variability. Additionally, various aircraft groundings and syllabus optimizations
occurring concurrently with research efforts in 2018 further complicated data tracking
and acquisition for this study [84], [85]. Attempting to draw conclusions and quality
comparisons from such data would be both grossly inaccurate and irresponsible.

Figure 5: UPT’s T-6 Average Evaluation Score Variability by Training Location
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Fortunately, a quality comparison between UPT and PTN was still possible
through insight gained from instructor interviews. PTN’s experienced cadre, with their
significant insight from their combined experience with UPT, FTU, and PTN students,
provided this study with unique positional feedback pertinent to the quality of the PTN
approach.
During PTN, instructors act as both a coach and simulated air traffic controllers
during student training and evaluation flights. This method adds both chaos and realism
to the virtual reality training, augmenting each PTN student pilot’s off-duty practice.
Some instructors cited the experimental, low-threat atmosphere of PTN that gave each
student more freedom to accelerate their own proficiency. Others claimed the adoption
of more pilot-friendly technology and flexibility allowed instructors to teach each student
in innovative ways. Still others cited benefits of selective recruitment and previous
USAF training outcomes.
Despite the disparity in the underlying cause, PTN instructors were unanimous in
the assertion that PTN graduates are talented, highly motivated, and promising aviators.
Per the instructors, the greatest common impact to overall quality came from students’
ability to strengthen their skills flying virtually prior to entering an actual training
aircraft. According to PTN instructors, this practice enabled PTN students to fly ‘leaps
and bounds’ ahead of their legacy UPT peers, even on their first flight in a real aircraft.
This lead to PTN students performing feats unheard of in legacy UPT, including
performing landings without direct instructor intervention on their first flight in the
training aircraft. According to instructors, this level of proficiency was not normally seen
until the fifth UPT flight.
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In a compounding cycle, class-leading students motivated instructors to engage
opportunities to rapidly train on many different airframes without the limitation of
needing to source real aircraft and learn the intricacies of specific operating procedures
prior to flight. Halfway through PTN training, instructors claimed PTN pilots
demonstrated superior T-6 proficiency compared to their UPT peers, and many showed
comparable flight proficiency to mid-course FTU students. Furthermore, all instructors
interviewed agreed that PTN graduates were at least as good as, if not better than many of
the instructor’s previous pupils taught using legacy USAF pilot training methods.
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V.

Conclusion

This section redresses the research questions and their implication to the USAF,
suggests ideas for future research, and provides the study’s final thoughts. This study
focused on comparing PTN to UPT with respect to cost, production, and quality, and the
results of this cost-benefit analysis support PTN’s innovation as the catalyst necessary for
overcoming organizational resistance to virtual reality training in the USAF and,
potentially, wider application throughout the DoD.
Cost
This study’s cost investigative question centered on the comparison of PTN’s
initial, fixed, and variable costs compared to UPT. While the initial cost was determined
largely by budgeting and attrition, the more important comparison stems from the fixed
and variable costs per graduate. As shown in the cost analysis, PTN’s MAF fixed costs
equate to less than half of UPT’s, while PTN’s CAF is nearly a quarter of UPT’s CAF
cost. Similarly, PTN’s variable costs are a third and tenth (MAF and CAF, respectively)
of UPTs costs. While the lower cost is attributable to reduced time-to-train and
significant decrease in logistics costs associated with supporting multiple airframes (e.g.,
T-1 and T-38) the implications of cost savings extend beyond just pilot training.
The PTN innovation not only represents a significant cost savings for the USAF,
but these savings will compound each year. Coupled with the maturation of more
accurate financial programming, the USAF can simultaneously train pilots to offset the
shortage and use the remaining funds to help procure new airframes for them to pilot in
prosecution of the USAF’s mission. For example, based on current PTN track ratios and
full utilization of T-6 current flying hours, in ten years the USAF could train 14,444
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pilots and fix the shortage at a savings of $8.96B (fixed cost) and $3.96B (variable cost).
These funds could then be reallocated to other fiscally scrutinized programs like the B21, T-X, KC-46, and F-35.
Production
This study’s two production investigative questions focused on determining
PTN’s impact to USAF mission-ready pilot availability with respect to aircraft and
instructor utilization and determining how quickly full implementation of PTN—
provided current support levels—could heal the current pilot shortage. While the
analysis drew from the best available information during research, it must be understood
that real-world application may not occur as cleanly and seamlessly as projected.
Nevertheless, PTN, if applied to its full potential, offers a potential solution to the USAF
pilot shortage.
Although PTN could produce pilots faster (approximately 6 months), simply
replacing UPT with PTN does not represent the most optimal change. PTN graduates
will still wait to enter and complete the FTU and additional training before they are
mission-ready in their respective primary aircrafts. However, the PTN model provides
great promise on many of the issues impacting current production and could have
positive impact on pilot availability via 1) reduced hours required in each aircraft, 2)
reduced demand for instructors, 3) increased total Pilot Ready Years. To wit, if PTN
only replaces UPT this creates excess capacity and queuing prior to the FTU. If this flow
is maintained throughout the training pipeline the PTN approach will not represent a net
time-savings to the Air Force. At full application however, the Air Force could reduce
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total wait time while significantly increasing production capability, with the added
benefit of freeing up more aircraft for non-training purposes.
Keeping the current 2,400 pilot shortage in mind, one can safely assume this
number represents the minimum number of pilots needed to rectify the shortage. Given
the same conditions outlined in the analysis and assuming personnel levels hold constant,
fixing the shortage using the current training approach would take approximately 60
months. Replacing only UPT with PTN eliminates the shortage in 54 months. Stepping
back for a moment, not implementing PTN but removing the wait-time between UPT and
FTU achieves the same outcome in 48 months. Combining the benefits of previous
optimizations by implementing PTN for UPT and removing the wait-time heals the
shortage in 42 months. Better yet, PTN replacing UPT and FTU training with a reduction
of wait time could eradicate the shortage in as little as 36 months. However, if
production is expanded to the current UPT’s T-6 flying budget, or 1,444 pilots per year,
the shortage would disappear in 30 months after full implementation. This solution
represents a 71% increase in production without incurring the significant cost of overutilizing the T-6 fleet. This approach also provides the USAF a single-source solution to
the current shortage, while offering lower risk compared to the USAF’s previously
explored paths to fix the shortage.
Quality
This study’s quality investigative questions focused on establishing context and
comparison of evaluation flight scores between PTN and UPT pilots. Additionally, when
data acquisition to support this comparison failed to materialize, the study shifted to
establishing a comparison of how PTN graduates perform versus UPT peers during initial
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and follow-on training. Unfortunately, this effort failed to produce the intended
quantitative data due to timing. However, the promising reports from PTN instructors,
coupled with continued support of USAF leadership, adds to the motivation to continue
studying, optimizing, and engineering virtual reality as a cost-effective method for
increasing pilot production to offset the current shortage.
USAF Implications
A strategic comparison of benefits indicates that PTN is better from a cost and
production standpoint, but further analysis is required to make a comprehensive quality
comparison. With increased fiscal scrutiny on government and military spending, PTN’s
cost savings alone should motivate the USAF to pursue the program. Similarly, PTN’s
ability to fix the current pilot shortage in as little as 30 months allows the USAF to get
the desired end-state and frees Airmen to tackle other complex issues facing the USAF.
Even the lack of concrete quality comparison should not dampen motivation. Continuous
improvement during future iterations will provide quality comparison metrics, but the
real benefit lies in the USAF’s ability to utilize this time to decide the best mix of training
capabilities and outcomes to produce the best pilots. Ultimately, each success in the PTN
program increases validation, strengthens motivation, and positively offsets
organizational resistance until PTN’s innovation becomes the status quo for USAF pilot
production.
Future Research
As mentioned in the introduction, the lack of virtual reality pilot production
optimization studies represents a wealth of opportunity for future research. If research
interest includes USAF cost methods, AETC is, at the time of this writing, seeking a
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better process for accounting and forecasting pilot production costs. On the production
side, recent changes to UPT syllabi have reduced the time to train new pilots but USAF
leadership still seeks optimizations and application for scheduling and synchronizing
training between UPT and FTUs and integration of the new T-X system replacing the T38 [23]. There is also room for study in the adaptation of the PTN approach to other
airframes including drones, helicopters, and other specialized vehicles. For quality, there
are even more options. Though time-intensive and complicated by many factors,
securing historical UPT training data may yet prove useful. The data may permit
development of interactions to establish key variables for a regression comparison [86]
thus enabling an analysis of which training events are most impactful to forecasting pilot
success. Additionally, this information enhances the mutually beneficial study of transfer
of training effectiveness for flight training devices [67]. Ultimately, UPT performance
may not be as meaningful to the future researcher as FTU and career performance.
However, this presents an opportunity for a longitudinal study following PTN pilots over
their careers, though choosing the proper comparison metric may prove challenging.
If research interests do not involve pilot training, virtual reality training presents
opportunities to study adaptation to other fields, especially how to manage and succeed
with such applications from the organizational development perspective. Examples for
future study abound, including the following: studying the impact of crowd-sourced
virtual reality training on long-term individual task proficiency; measuring the
effectiveness of utilizing virtual training to improve recurring training and maintain task
proficiency; calculating the opportunity cost and intrinsic rewards of returning former
instructors to their primary roles; or delving into issues associated with international
technology access restrictions, network and physical security concerns or associated
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mitigation techniques. Virtual reality has great potential to impact learning and improve
quality of life; now is the time to discover and define the USAF’s path to that goal!
Final Thoughts
By acquisitions and systems engineering standards, PTN exists in a prototype
stage; the first step to achieving USAF shared vision for change. PTN—as an innovative
first step to overcome the pilot shortage—produced positive results as a concept
demonstrator. Next a low rate production phase should begin wherein changes and
improvements can be made prior to full scale production [2], [87] to maintain motivation.
This maturation, coupled with the knowledge gained in similar training improvement
initiatives will set the USAF up with a dynamic and repeatable method for increasing
pilot production. Successively improving production by fine-tuning the vital details
(personnel, infrastructure, and training events) saves time, money, and frustration prior to
going full-scale.
Following the axiom ‘slow is smooth, smooth is fast,’ deliberately and
methodically restructuring the training program will yield the pilot production the USAF
needs: fiscally responsible, high quality training with lower risk than shutting down,
retooling, restarting a new program, and with the benefit of no reductions in current
production output. Using this approach may delay the pilot shortage solution but allow
the current UPT to maintain production while PTN scales up. This approach allows the
USAF to leverage technology improvements and industry best practices for a bespoke
solution, dovetailing with current USAF leadership’s vision and guidance.
Lastly, while PTN should not replace current pilot training immediately, the
USAF should not wait to start a phased transition. Implementing virtual reality training
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now will allow the USAF to capitalize on the strengths of the emergent technology to the
cost advantage of the American taxpayer. As an early adopter, the USAF will benefit
from the efforts of previous virtual reality training implementations but still enjoy priority
when resolving initial issues, especially in light of fewer competing interests [88].
Ultimately, the experience will yield reduced learning curves as the USAF builds a
continuously improving, cost-effective and leading-edge training solution to offset the
current pilot shortage. PTN’s virtual reality training, with best practices shared across the
enterprise, not only solve the pilot shortage but also provide seminal success for the
USAF and DoD.
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VI.

Appendix: Cost Calculation

The following paragraphs detail the calculation method for the cost figures in
Table 3 (below), as utilized for Table 2 (in Cost Analysis, above). Setting the
benchmark, UPT platform specific costs (T-6, T-38 and T-1) were determined by
multiplying the logistics cost per flying hour (from AFI 65-503 Table A4-1, for fiscal
year 2018) by the average number of hours flown per student (from each respective
syllabus). UPT’s (non-virtual reality) simulator cost was based on that simulator’s costper-hour multiplied by number of hours required per student (also derived from each
respective syllabus). Support costs (base, payroll, and indirect costs) were calculated
using AETC Training Cost per Graduate data and subtracting flying costs from total cost
per graduate.
For comparison, PTN academic costs were derived as a ratio of PTN’s 4-week
timeline compared to UPT’s six-week timeline multiplied against UPT’s academic cost
per graduate. Next, PTN flying hours were averaged from PTN student gradebooks, then
multiplied by the logistics cost per flying hour (from AFI 65-503 Table A4-1, for fiscal
year 2018). PTN track costs were then calculated from each track’s average flying hours
multiplied against the logistics costs. PTN support costs were held equal to UPT as both
programs take approximately six months, implying they both should cost the host base
approximately the same to support. PTN’s virtual reality systems per-unit annual costs
included virtual reality software licenses, maintenance, hardware, and setup cost, all
sourced from AETC’s financial management’s contract wedge. Dividing these costs by
the 20 initial PTN candidates provides the current fixed cost per student. To calculate the
variable cost per additional student, the hardware cost was divided by four (representing
the number of courses in two years) then added to the software licensing costs.
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Table 3: UPT vs PTN Cost Comparison Components
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